Growth and Income Inequality Effects on Poverty: The Case of Pakistan (1988-2011) by Jamal, Haroon
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Growth and Income Inequality Effects on
Poverty: The Case of Pakistan
(1988-2011)
Haroon Jamal
Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC)
November 2014
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59897/
MPRA Paper No. 59897, posted 14 November 2014 20:17 UTC
 
 
 
Growth and Income Inequality Effects on Poverty: The Case of Pakistan 
 (1988-2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Haroon Jamal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Policy and Development Centre 
15, Maqbool Co-operative Housing Society 
Block 7 & 8, Karachi – 75350, Pakistan  
    
   [www.spdc.org.pk] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this research report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
hose of the Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC). Research Reports describe research in progress by the 
author and are published to elicit comments and initiate further debate 
 
 
Growth and Income Inequality Effects on Poverty: The Case of Pakistan 
 (1988-2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
 
This research assesses the distributional characteristics of growth 
in Pakistan by applying statistical techniques suggested in the 
empirical literature on poverty and income inequality. An attempt 
is also made to determine the relative contribution of economic 
growth and distribution of income to changes in poverty. 
 
Various episodes of growth are considered during the period 1988-
2011.  The findings of the research will facilitate policy makers to 
evaluate growth strategies in terms of pro-poorness or growth with 
equity.    
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1. Introduction 
 
During the last three decades, vast literature on the relationship between growth, poverty and 
income distribution has flourished.  Empirical studies have investigated causality and links from 
growth to poverty, from growth to inequality, from inequality to growth or from inequality to 
poverty.       
 
The development literature in 1990s suggested that growth is central to any strategy aimed at 
poverty reduction. Empirical studies concluded that countries that made noticeable progress on 
poverty reduction were those which recorded fast and high growth rates. However, this view was 
modified after empirical investigation and it was suggested that it is not growth per se, but the 
structure of growth that matters (Ravallion and Datt, 1996, Mellor 1999)1.  
 
The ‘primacy of growth’ paradigm assumes a trade-off between growth and equity. Based on 
initial research findings, it was maintained that distribution policies give rise to distortions in the 
economy, resulting in inefficiencies that may be substantial enough to adversely affect the 
overall well being of society. It is also argued that inequality within a country is stable over time 
and changes too slowly to make a significant difference in poverty reduction. The conclusion 
drawn is that growth must precede distribution, and that the poor will pay the price of growth in 
terms of inequality and poverty until such time that growth builds up a 'reservoir' of wealth and 
its benefits trickle down in sufficient measure to reduce poverty (SPDC, 2004).  
 
The contention of positive relationship between inequality and growth has been questioned in the 
empirical evidence based on rigorous testing of cross-country data. For instance, Knowles (2001) 
reconfirms the negative effects of inequality on growth using updated and more comparable 
inequality data. The emerging consensus now is that inequality is harmful for growth; although 
disagreement exists on the underlying mechanisms. There are at least three main arguments in 
support of a negative effect of inequality on growth. These routes or mechanisms have been 
summarized in Perotti (1996). The first argument is that an unequal distribution of income will 
lead to pressure for redistribution through higher government expenditure and distortionary 
taxes. This would reduce the growth rate. The second argument is that inequality may lead to 
socio-political instability, which in turn will reduce investment and growth. The third argument 
is that in the presence of imperfect capital markets, inequality will reduce investment in human 
capital and this will also in turn reduce growth.  
 
While empirical evidence predominantly suggests that inequality is bad for growth (Naschold, 
2002), it is reasoned that there does not exist an unavoidable trade-off between growth and 
equity. The World Development Report (2000/01) concludes that better distribution is possible 
without a reduction in economic growth. Given that there is no trade-off per se between growth 
and equality, it follows that distribution can be pursued as an additional policy objective to 
enhance the poverty reducing effect of growth. The removal or correction of the various anti-
poor institutional constraints and policy-induced biases is likely to actually improve market 
efficiency while promoting equity. For instance, social policy ensuring adequate provision of 
education and health services to the poor can improve their productivity and contribution to the 
                                                            
1 This version or modification is very much similar to the recent literature on the inclusiveness of growth. 
economy. Therefore, the conclusion drawn is that poverty reduction is not a function of high or 
low growth but rather of distribution sensitive growth (Naschold, 2002).  
 
Although, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that the combination of growth and distribution 
are essential for poverty reduction (e.g., Deininger-Squire 1998; Foster and Szekely 2001; 
Ravallion 2002; Krayy 2004), Bourguignon (2004) has redirected the attention from the growth-
distribution debate to the interaction between growth and distribution in reducing absolute 
poverty. He suggested a poverty-growth-inequality triangle hypothesis that is based on the idea 
that development strategy should be guided by the goal of reducing absolute poverty, which can 
be achieved by implementing country-specific combination of growth and distribution policies.  
 
This research contributes to the debate by assessing the distributional characteristics of growth in 
Pakistan. Statistical techniques suggested in the empirical literature on redistribution and growth 
are applied to analyze the historical relationship between growth, poverty and inequality. It also 
quantifies the relative role of income distribution in Pakistan’s poverty reduction. Section 2 
describes the situation analysis in terms of trends in the poverty and inequality during the period 
1987-88 to 2010-11. The analysis of poverty decomposition into growth and income distribution 
components is provided in section 3, while the subsequent section evaluates Pakistan’s growth 
with respect to its ‘pro-poorness’. The last section summarizes the research findings.           
 
 
2. Poverty and Inequality Profile  
 
This section furnishes the poverty and inequality estimates, derived from various household 
surveys during the period 1987-88 and 2010-11. Issues in poverty measurement are also 
discussed briefly to comprehend the problems and variations in deriving poverty line from 
household consumption data.   
 
2.1 Poverty Measurement  
Among the various approaches of defining monetary2 (income/consumption) or traditional 
poverty, ‘calorific approach’ is the most popular in developing countries due to its practicality.  
Almost in all studies of poverty in LDCs including Pakistan, poverty level is defined in terms of 
food inadequacy which is typically measured by the lack of nutritional (calorie) requirements. 
Correspondingly, Government of Pakistan adopted this approach for estimating official poverty 
line. According to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP-I, GOP, 2003), Planning 
Commission described the following definition for estimating the poverty line. 
 
“Calorific requirement approach wherein all those households (or individuals) are classified as 
poor who do not have income sufficient to allow a consumption pattern consistent with minimum 
calorie requirements (2350 calories per adult equivalent per day). It is also assumed that the 
                                                            
2 The assessment of non-income and multidimensional poverty is also important for policy and planning.   However, 
it is worth highlighting that consumption or income poverty measures only advocate the case for transfer policies 
and social safety-nets that alleviate poverty in the short-term, whereas multidimensional (education, health, 
housing etc.) measures facilitate policy makers in designing socio-economic policies that could alleviate the 
intergenerational poverty in the long-term.  
 
households earning incomes equivalent to poverty line not only have sufficient food to meet the 
minimum nutrition requirements but also the non-food requirements”. 
 
Poverty can then be used to define the poor by total (food and non-food) expenditure failing 
short of the poverty line by the average dietary pattern the expenditure would translate into fewer 
calories than required. To estimate poverty line, first step is to translate household food 
consumption into calories. Food Consumption Tables for Pakistan (GoP, 2001) facilitates this 
conversion. Moreover, the recommended daily allowances for the Pakistani population for 
various age and sex composition are also provided in the Food Consumption Tables. These 
minimum requirements are matched with household demography (sex and age of members) to 
estimate adult equivalent unit (AEU) for each household. Now, to get the estimates of household 
expenditure required to obtain the minimum required calories, Calorie-Consumption Function 
(CCF) is estimated. Poverty line is then computed by combining calorie norms (minimum 
required calories) and estimated coefficients of the CCF. 
 
This author also adopts the calorific approach, defined above to estimate the poverty indices in 
Pakistan however with slight modifications3.  The major deviations with the official 
methodology are as follows:   
 
• Government of Pakistan does not estimate separate urban and rural poverty lines. The 
rural lifestyle in general requires a greater consumption of calories than the urban 
lifestyle. It is not irrational to assume that for any given level of income, rural households 
are likely to consume more calories, on average, than their urban counterparts. Thus 
poverty estimates derived from official methodology using unique poverty line for both 
urban and rural households underestimate rural poverty and overestimate the urban 
poverty.   
This study therefore considers separate calorie requirement and follows the 2550 and 
2230 calories per day per adult as calorie norms4 (minimum requirement) for rural and 
urban areas, respectively. 
  
• The official methodology uses first three per adult equivalent consumption quintiles (60 
percent) to estimate CCF by arguing that the consumption pattern of the rich does not 
affect the determination of the poverty line. This is however against the popular 
perception of magnitude of poverty in Pakistan. 
 
This study estimates CCF from the lowest quartile (25 percent) of distribution after 
ranking households by per capita expenditure to reflect the average dietary pattern of 
only low income group in the estimation of poverty line. 
 
• To monitor poverty level or to estimate the inter-temporal changes in the poverty 
magnitude, poverty line for the latest survey year may either be updated by utilizing 
                                                            
3  For detail, see Jamal (2002, 2006, 2007 and 2013).  
 
4  The justifications of taking these norms are described in Jamal (2002). 
 
previous estimated poverty line after adjusting with some appropriate index of inflation 
or it may be re-estimated with the help of new available consumption data.  
 
Government of Pakistan adjusts the previous poverty line with inflation index to estimate 
the new level of poverty. To estimate official poverty estimates, two price indices are 
considered; Consumer Price Index (CPI) and survey based price index; the Tornqvist 
Price Index (TPI). There are many criticisms on using Consumer Price Index (CPI) for 
updating previous poverty line due to its very low geographical coverage. CPI only 
covers major urban centers for tracking inflation and ignores price movement in rural 
areas and small urban locations. As an alternative therefore survey based price index 
(TPI) is suggested. However, it is not a problem-free option, since TPI can only 
incorporate homogenous goods like specific food items. Further, the household survey 
does not report the consumption of non-food quantities and provides only expenditures. 
These complications make TPI an inappropriate measure of inflation. The extent of 
adjustment in TPI can be ascertained from the fact that TPI includes only 75 items, 
whereas CPI includes more than 400 items. 
    
On the other hand, re-estimation of poverty line is also criticized on the ground that for 
monitoring and tracking poverty numbers, the bundle of goods and services should 
remain same and one should adjust the magnitude of the poverty line with price 
movement. However, this criticism does not seem valid if ‘calorific approach’ is used in 
deriving poverty line instead of ‘basic need approach’5 . With the fixed norms, in the 
calorific approach it is estimated that how many rupees are required to obtain minimum 
required calories with the observed consumption pattern for the particular year.  
          
Thus, in the absence of any appropriate price index for inflating the previous poverty line, 
it is perhaps reasonable and is also preferred for this research to re-estimate the poverty 
line from the latest survey to circumvent problems associated with price indices.     
 
Specifically to measure the poverty line and poverty estimates, per adult equivalent household 
calories consumption is regressed on the lowest quintile of household per adult equivalent total 
expenditure, including value of goods consumed from own production. The provincial dummy 
variables6 are also included in the regression function to capture the provincial dissimilarities with 
respect to socio-economic development. The regression coefficient of CCF gives an idea that how 
much rupees, on average are required to have one calorie.  Rural and urban poverty lines are then 
computed by combining calorie norms (minimum required calories) and estimated coefficients of 
the CCF. Once a poverty line is defined, and hence the household poverty status determined 
through relating poverty line and household consumption, the question is how to aggregate this 
                                                            
5  See Jamal (2002) for the methodological consideration and choices. 
  
6  It is worth mentioning that provincial dummy variables are not included in the calorie-expenditure regression 
function for estimating poverty line in the official (Government of Pakistan) methodology. 
   
information into a single index to proxy the status of a group of individuals. This study reports the 
most popular measure, namely the Headcount Index or Poverty Incidence7.  
 
2.2 Poverty Estimates 
Figure-1 portrays the trend in poverty incidence since 1987-88. All these poverty numbers are 
estimated using unit record household level data of Household Integrated Economic Surveys 
(HIES). The HIES includes standard and detailed consumption modules and is traditionally used 
to estimate poverty in Pakistan. Moreover, a consistent and identical methodology is applied 
throughout the period of analysis for estimating poverty line. 
 
 
 
Figure - 1  
National and Regional Poverty Estimates  
[Percentage of Population Below the Poverty Line] 
 
Overall 23 30 33 30 34 38 
  [3.04] [3.33] [-3.03] [4.44] [3.92] 
Urban 19 25 30 28 37 34 
  [3.16] [6.67] [-2.22] [10.71] [-2.70] 
Rural 26 32 35 31 33 39 
[2.31] [3.13] [-3.81] [2.15] [6.06] 
 
Notes: Annualized Growth Rates (percent) from previous period are given in square brackets. 
 Author’s estimates based on unit record data of HIES, various years 
 
  
                                                            
7  Headcount assigns equal weights to all poor regardless of the extent of poverty.  However, there are other measures 
which are sensitive to distribution among the poor and combine both the incidence and intensity of poverty. Poverty 
Gap and Poverty severity are famous in the poverty literature.  For detail see Appendix-B of Jamal (2013). These 
poverty measures for various years are available in Jamal (2013 and 2007).  
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Figure-2 
Poverty and GDP 
 
Figure-1 indicates a relatively higher incidence in rural poverty during the period 1987-88 and 
2010-11. The figure also reveals that poverty has shown a declining trend only in the period 
2001-2005. A comparison of this period shows a decline of 3 percentage point in poverty 
incidence. Moreover, the decline in urban poverty is relatively less than the rural poverty. Rural 
poverty in this period has dropped with an annual growth rate of about 4 percent as compared 
with 2 percent decline in the case of urban poverty incidence. Since 2004-05, poverty incidences 
are showing again an upward trend. The estimates derived from the latest available HIES data 
(2010-11) indicate an incidence of 38 percent. The regional picture reveals that about 34 and 39 
percent population were below the poverty line during the year 2010-11 for urban and rural areas 
respectively.       
 
There is consensus among researchers and analysts that economic growth may not always be a 
sufficient condition for poverty reduction but it certainly is a necessary one.  To illustrate the point, 
a historical relationship between the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth and poverty incidence 
is plotted in Figure-2. In general, the chart suggests an inverse relationship between poverty and 
economic growth. 
 
2.3 Profile of Income Inequality 
Various inequality measures are computed to observe trends in per capita income inequality. 
Table-1 portrays trends in national, urban, and rural income inequality as measured by Gini 
coefficient and income shares during the period 1988-2011.  
 
The Gini coefficient provides an estimate of resource inequality within a population. It is the 
most popular and well-known measure of inequality and summarizes the extent to which actual 
distribution of resource differs from a hypothetical distribution in which each person/unit 
receives an identical share. Gini is a dimensionless index scaled to vary from a minimum of zero 
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to a maximum of one; zero representing no inequality and one representing the maximum 
possible degree of inequality.  
 
A limitation of the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality is that it is most sensitive to the 
middle part of income distribution than to that of extremes because it depends on the rank order 
weights of income recipients and on the number of recipients within a given range. Thus, to 
capture small changes in extreme parts of income distribution, the lowest and highest quintile 
income shares are also computed to supplement the estimates of Gini coefficient.  Table-1 
furnishes estimates of these inequality measures for various years during the period 1988-2011.  
 
 
Table–1  
Per Capita Income Inequality 
    1987-88 1998-99 2001-02 2004-05 2007-08 2010-11 
Gini Coefficients 
Pakistan   0.350 0.400 0.411 0.407 0.420 0.407 
Urban   0.400 0.420 0.439 0.428 0.428 0.411 
Rural   0.300 0.360 0.357 0.347 0.384 0.373 
    
Income Share of the Lowest 20% of the Population 
Pakistan   8.8 7.8 7.0 7.2 6.7 7.0 
Urban   7.8 6.6 6.6 6.5 6.6 6.8 
Rural   9.6 8.7 8.0 8.5 7.5 8.1 
    
Income of the Highest 20% of the Population 
Pakistan   43.5 46.5 47.6 48.8 49.2 48.7 
Urban   47.8 50.1 50.3 50.4 50.8 49.8 
Rural   40.0 41.8 43.2 43.4 46.5 45.8 
    
Ratio of the Highest to the Lowest 
Pakistan   4.9 6.0 6.8 6.8 7.3 6.9 
Urban   6.1 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.7 7.3 
Rural   4.2 4.8 5.5 5.2 6.2 5.7 
 Note: Author’s estimates based on unit record household data of HIES, various years 
 
The table reveals an increase of about 6 basis points in the magnitude of Gini coefficient during 
the period 1988-2011. Rural income inequality has increased more severely in this period than 
the rise in urban income inequality (73 versus 11 basis points). Persistent low growth during the 
period 1987-88 and 1998-99 resulted significant deterioration in the income distribution as 
measured by inequality measures. On the contrary in the high growth episode (2001-2005), an 
improvement of about 10 basis points is observed in both urban and rural income Gini 
coefficients. A significant deterioration in rural income inequality is also observed during the 
period 2005-2011. The rural Gini coefficient for per capita income has increased approximately 
6 percent from 0.35 to 0.37.  This decline somehow was adjusted with the slight improvement in 
the urban income distribution and thus leaving national Gini unchanged.  
 
Table-1 also provides information regarding the share of income accruing to the lowest 20 
percent (i.e. the lowest quintile) and to the highest 20 percent (i.e. the highest quintile) of the 
population. Statistics with respect to income shares show that in 1987-88, the lowest quintile 
obtained about 8.8 percent of the national income while the highest quintile obtained 43.5 
percent of the income. By 2010-11, the share of lowest quintile had reduces to 7 percent and that 
of the highest quintiles increased to 48.7 percent.  The period 2005-2011 witnessed a decline in 
the national share of lowest 20 percent of population from 7.2 to 7.0 mainly due to the fall (from 
8.5 to 8.1) in rural income share of the lowest quintile. On the contrary, the table indicates a 
significant rise in the rural share of highest 20 percent of population from 43.4 to 45.8 at the cost 
of lowest income quintile. Like Gini, the increase in the ratio of the highest to lowest rural 
income share clearly indicates deterioration in the rural income distribution during the period 
2005-11, whereas a slight improvement in the urban income distribution has been recorded 
during the period.    
 
 
3. Poverty-Growth-Inequality Nexus  
 
According to Poverty-Growth-Inequality hypothesis, the extent and magnitude of absolute 
poverty depends on two factors: the growth of the mean level of real per capita income and the 
degree of inequality in the distribution of income. In general, at any given level of per capita 
income, the more unequal the distribution of income, the greater is the incidence of poverty. 
Likewise, for any given pattern of income distribution, the lower the level of per capita income, 
the greater is the incidence of poverty.  
 
To comprehend the development outcome in terms of growth, poverty and inequality for the 
period 1988-2011, trends in real GDP, the Gini coefficient and headcount (poverty incidence) in 
Pakistan are sketched in Figure-3.  
 
Figure-3 
Poverty, Inequality and Growth 
[1987-88 to 2010-11] 
 
In terms of growth-inequality nexus, the phenomenon of low level of inequality with high level 
of income is evident from the figure. High growth rates have resulted in a slight decline in the 
Gini magnitude during the period 2002 and 2005. Similarly, low growth over relatively a long 
spell (1987-88 to 1998-99) resulted in higher magnitude of the Gini coefficient. The inverse 
relationship between poverty and growth is, however more discernible in the figure.   
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To quantify the influence of growth and inequality on poverty, a conventional poverty 
decomposition approach is used with slight modification. The methodology, which is proposed 
by Ravallion and Huppi (1991) and Datt and Ravallion (1992) decomposes changes in poverty 
indices into its growth and distribution components8 in order to assess the relative role played by 
each. The decomposition exercise is carried out for various survey years and the estimates are 
furnished in Table-2. The results answer the question of what the poverty outcomes would be 
under distributional neutrality.  
 
 
Table-2   
Decomposition of Poverty Incidence 
 
 
Change in Poverty  
[Percentage point] 
 
 
 
 
Change Due to: 
 
Real GDP Growth 
[Periods’ Average] 
 
Survey 
Periods 
[HIES] 
 
Growth 
 
Redistribution 
 
 GDP 
 
Per Capita 
 
1988-1999 6.95 6.55 0.40 4.67 2.12 
1999-2008 3.93 6.15 -2.22 5.07 2.72 
2008-2011 5.10 8.54 -3.44 2.19 0.20 
  
  
1999-2002 2.97 5.58 -2.61 3.35 0.55 
2001-2005 -2.61 -5.04 2.43 6.07 4.03 
2005-2008 3.64 5.66 -2.02 5.49 3.14 
  
  Note: Author’s estimates based on unit record data of HIES, various years.  
 
The decomposition results are arranged according to the governance in the different political 
regimes during the period of analysis; 1988-98 (democratic rule), 1999-2008 (Military rule) and 
2008-2011 (democratic rule). The military rule (Musharaf’s era) is further divided in three 
episodes according to the observed growth phenomenon (low, high and again low growth).        
 
The findings of the table in terms of coefficients of growth and redistribution suggest that overall 
growth was the main cause for the increase in the poverty level during the period of analysis. On 
the contrary barring the period 2001-2005, the redistribution component prevented the level of 
poverty to rise even further. For instance during the period 2008-2011, an increase of 8.54 
percent in the poverty incidence is observed due to low growth, while redistribution neutralized 
this to the extent of 3.44 percent and thus leaving the net change in poverty of about 5 percent.          
 
According to the table, if growth had been distributionally neutral in the 2001-2005 period (high 
growth period), the incidence of poverty would have declined by 5 percentage points instead of 
2.61 percentage points. The evidence clearly reveals that unequal distribution has blunted the  
impact of growth on poverty.  Similarly in a low growth period (1988-98), poverty would have 
gone up by 6.55 percentage points instead of 6.95 if growth had been distributionally neutral. 
                                                            
8  A brief description of Datt and Ravallion (1992) methodology is provided in the Appendix-A. 
 
The magnitudes of decomposition reveal that poverty has risen by almost 94 percent due to low 
growth and about 6 percent due to rise in inequality for the period 1988-98.  
 
Results in Table-2 also suggest that the role of income distribution is relatively more important 
in high growth periods as evident from the magnitudes of redistribution component in both 
scenarios. The positive redistribution component is about 6 times higher in the period 2001-05 as 
compared with the period 1988-98.               
 
4. Assessing Pro-Poorness of Selected Growth Episodes9 
 
The evaluation of economic growth to analyze whether distributional changes are "pro-poor" has 
become increasingly widespread in academic and policy circles. The definition of ‘pro-poor 
growth’ however is still somewhat arbitrary. International development agencies define pro-poor 
growth as “growth that benefits the poor and provides them with opportunities to improve their 
economic situation”.  
 
From the measurement point of view, pro-poor growth can refer to either a relative or absolute 
concept of poverty reduction. Thus, the debate on defining pro-poor growth has very similar 
characteristics to the debate on how to measure poverty. This is equivalent to asking whether we 
should be interested in the impact of growth on absolute poverty or on relative inequality. 
 
The absolute definition concentrates on the absolute level of growth for the poor. Growth is 
considered pro-poor if the poor population benefits from it in absolute terms, irrespective of how 
the total gains are distributed within the country in question. According to Ravallion and Chen 
(2003), the growth process is said to be ‘pro-poor’ only if poor people benefit in absolute terms. 
The extent to which growth is pro-poor by this definition depends solely on the rate of change in 
poverty. However, this will naturally depend in part on what happens to income distribution as 
well as to average living standards. Ravallion’s absolute perspective of pro-poor growth is 
identical with the concept of poverty reducing growth and refers to the totality of the growth 
process. Thus, it advocates the ‘primacy of growth’ paradigm and ’trickle down’ philosophy. 
According to Ravallion and Chen (2001), it is possible that both the poor and the non-poor see a 
drastic reduction in income but in relative terms, the income of the poor is less severely affected 
than that of the non-poor. Under a relative measure, this would mean growth would have been 
pro-poor even though the poor have seen an absolute decrease in income. They also argue that 
policy interventions targeted at reducing inequality alone may hurt economic growth and have a 
net negative effect on society. Moreover, Ravallion and Chen are in opinion that in operational 
terms, absolute measures tend to provide assessments that are more easily understood than 
relative ones. 
 
The relative definition, proposed by Kakwani and others, classifies growth as pro-poor when 
growth implies distributional effects favoring the poor. In other words, when the poor gain from 
economic growth proportionally more relative to the non-poor, the nature of growth is said to be 
pro-poor. Thus, the relative perspective stresses the existence of a bias in favor of the poor. 
According to Kakwani and Pernia, 2000), pro-poor growth is described as a situation in which 
any distributional shifts accompanying economic growth favor the poor, meaning that poverty 
                                                            
9 This section is largely benefited from the author’s previous work, Jamal (2009)  
falls more than it would have if all income levels had grown at the same rate. Kakwani et. al. 
(2004) argue, “The trickle-down development, which was the dominant thinking in the 1950s 
and 1960s, also reduces poverty but the rate of poverty reduction may be much slower. It is the 
slowness of poverty reduction that has generated interest in the concept of pro-poor growth. It is 
now being realized that neither growth itself nor growth-enhancing policies are likely to result in 
a rapid reduction in poverty. Pro-poor growth raises a call for enhancing growth that also 
delivers proportionally greater benefits to the poor than to the rich”. Therefore, the relative 
definition of pro-poorness has been widely used in the literature due to its intuitive appeal, but it 
also has limitations. As maintained by Ravallion and Chen (2001), concentrating solely on the 
inequality aspects and disregarding the absolute levels of growth might end up favoring growth 
strategies that are suboptimal for both the poor and the rich.  
 
Osmani (2005) however argues that he “find(s) both their definitions problematic”. He suggests 
identifying a benchmark first that allows gauging of the pro-poorness of growth. ‘Pro-poor 
growth’ is then defined as a growth process that reduces poverty more than the benchmark.  
 
Due to practical difficulties and subjectivity in identifying the benchmark, most of the empirical 
literature on ‘pro-poorness’ however has evolved around Ravallion’s absolute and Kakwani’s 
relative perspective.  Both perspectives on pro-poor growth are relevant for designing different 
policies and routes for poverty reduction.  
 
This research evaluates Pakistan’s growth performance in terms of both absolute and relative 
pro-poorness to combine the strength of both perspectives10. Two growth episodes are selected 
for this exercise; 1988-1999 (low growth scenario) and 2001-2005 (high growth scenario). In the 
context of terminology, ‘Rate of Pro-Poor Growth’ (RPPG) or Growth Incidence Curve (GIC) 
and ‘Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate’ (PEGR) for the absolute and the relative perspectives are 
used respectively to assess pro-poorness of the growth process. Growth will be assumed to be 
pro-poor if the average GIC and PEGR are higher than the actual (ordinary) mean growth rate.  
 
Figures 4 and 5 are developed to portray a sketch of the absolute pro-poorness of the growth 
process as measured by Growth Incidence Curve (GIC)11. These figures plot distribution 
corrected growth in the average decile consumption12 per capita. A decline in real consumption 
was observed during low GDP growth period of 90’s (1987-88 to 1998-99). However, Figure-4 
clearly reveals that the poor (bottom deciles) have been more adversely affected as compared 
with top deciles. Figure-5 summarizes growth in mean quintile consumption for the high growth 
episode (2001-2005). The figure also confirms that relatively high growth in the years 2000-01 
and 2004-05 did not go to the poor as much as to the non-poor. It is evident from the figure that 
the highest growth is observed in the top three deciles. Both figures assert the nature of 
Pakistan’s growth, which is evidently not ‘pro-poor’.          
                                                            
10  Brief methodologies for measuring absolute and relative pro-poorness of growth are provided in the Appendix–B.    
 
11  DAD software (version 4.6) is used for estimating GIC curves and RPPG. The software is designed and 
developed by Jean-Yves Duclos, Araar Abdelkrim and Cari Fortin of Laval University (Canada). 
 
12 Traditionally in Pakistan, poverty indices are estimated using consumption data. Therefore, growth in mean decile 
consumption per capita is plotted instead of mean decile income per capita. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Per Capita Distributionally Corrected Consumption Growth  
[1987-1988 to 1998-1999] 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Per Capita Distributionally Corrected Consumption Growth  
 [2000-2001 to 2004-2005] 
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Table 3 
Pro-Poorness Assessment in Low and High Growth Episodes 
 Low Growth  
 
1987-88 vs. 1998-99 
High Growth 
 
2001-01 vs. 2004-05 
Growth in Real per Capita Mean 
Consumption – Ordinary Growth 
[Household Surveys] 
 
-1.84 13.45 
RPPG - GIC (50th Percentile) 
[Absolute Perspective] 
 
 
Nature of Growth 
-2.59 
 
 
 
[Not Pro-Poor] 
 
10.45 
 
 
 
[Not Pro-Poor] 
Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate  
[Relative Perspective]  
 
 
Nature of Growth 
-5.66 
 
 
 
[Not Pro-Poor] 
 
6.08 
 
 
 
[Not Pro-Poor] 
Note:  Author’s estimates based on unit record data of HIES, various years 
 
Table-3 summarizes the assessment of Pakistan’s growth in terms of pro-poorness13 using both 
perspectives. The absolute perspective reveals that during the low growth period of the 90’s, the 
RPPG (GIC at 50th percentile) is lower than the rate of average decline. This phenomenon 
indicates that the nature of growth is not ‘pro-poor’. According to Ravallion (2004), if the 
distributional-shifts favor the poor, than the rate of pro-poor growth exceeds the ordinary growth. 
It is also evident from the table that the magnitude of RPPG is also lower than the growth in real 
mean consumption during high growth period (2001-2005). Thus the estimation of RPPG or GIC 
for Pakistan confirms that the nature of growth is not ‘pro-poor’, even in high growth episode. 
The growth, although reduced poverty during the period 2001-05, did not benefit lower income 
groups by much due to deterioration in the income distribution.     
 
The relative perception of pro-poorness (PEGR), which is more attractive due to giving 
proportionally more weights to the poor or lower income deciles also asserts that the nature of 
growth was not in favor of poor for the growth periods considered in the analysis. PERG is lower 
than the growth in mean consumption in both growth episodes. This suggests that the non-poor 
benefitted more than the poor, even in a high growth scenario.            
 
  
                                                            
13 Very brief overview of empirical findings in the context of Pakistan from the relevant earlier studies is provided in 
the Appendix-C. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
This study scrutinizes the Pakistan’s empirics on growth, poverty and inequality in terms of 
poverty decomposition into growth and distribution components and assessment of growth in 
terms of its distributional neutrality with the help of widely-used statistical tools.  
 
Decomposition of poverty into growth and inequality components answers the question of what 
poverty outcomes would be under distributional neutrality. The results presented in this research 
suggest that unequal distribution has blunted the poverty impact of growth in a high-growth 
poverty-reducing episode. The findings in terms of coefficients of growth and redistribution 
suggest that overall growth was the main cause for the increase in the poverty level during the 
period of analysis. On the contrary, the redistribution component provided a cushion to prevent 
the poverty to rise even further.  
 
Two growth episodes are examined in term of pro-poorness. High economic growth that 
occurred during the early 2000’s led to poverty reduction but was not accompanied by lowering 
inequality. The evaluation of growth during 2001-2005 suggests that the rich benefited much 
more than the poor. This eventually resulted in a lower reduction of the poverty incidence. On 
the contrary, the poor have been more adversely affected during a low growth scenario during 
the period 1988-98. The estimated results regarding the measurement of pro-poorness of growth 
suggest that the nature of growth is not pro-poor in Pakistan.   
 
Pakistan’s evidence supports the thesis that economic growth alone does not guarantee sustained 
poverty reduction. The evidence of high growth during the period 2001-2005 in Pakistan clearly 
indicates that without equity consideration, the benefit of growth may impede the rate of poverty 
reduction. For “pro-poor growth” to take place, policies must be both pro-growth and pro-equity.
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Appendix – A 
Poverty Decomposition Methodology: 
 
 
The method proposed by Ravallion and Huppi (1991) decomposes the changes in poverty indices (incidence, 
poverty gap, poverty severity etc.) into its growth and distribution components. Let P* denote the measure of poverty 
in period 2 in only mean consumption which has changed since period 1 without any change in relative consumption 
level; that is, P* is obtained by applying the period 2 mean to the period 1 distribution. Similarly, let P** denote the 
poverty level in period 2 if only the distribution (Lorenz curve) had shifted since period 1, leaving the mean 
consumption unchanged.  In practice, the redistribution component is calculated by multiplying each observation in 
the period 2 dataset by the ratio of the period 1 to the period 2 mean consumption. The observed change in poverty 
between the two periods can then be decomposed into growth and distributional effects as follows: 
 
 
              ௧ܲଶ െ ௧ܲଵ  ൌ   ሺܲכ െ  ௧ܲଵሻ          ൅    ሺܲככ െ  ௧ܲଵሻ            ൅  ܴ݁ݏ݅݀ݑ݈ܽ 
                      [Growth Effect]  +   [Distribution Effect] 
 
The growth component captures the effect of the changing level of mean expenditure between t1 and t2, while 
maintaining the t1 distribution. The redistribution component shows the effect of the changes in distribution, while 
maintaining mean expenditure at its t1 level.  
 
This decomposition method however also computes a residual component, which they explain as the interaction of 
growth and redistribution process. Shorrocks (1999) modified this decomposition method using the concept 
introduced by Shapley (1953). The advantage of this method is the elimination of the residual component or “black 
box” that remains unexplained in conventional decomposition techniques. Due to criticism on the residual term, the 
modified decomposition method proposed by Shorrocks (1999) is used in this paper14.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
14 DAD software (version 4.6) is used for decomposing poverty indices. The software is designed and developed by 
Jean-Yves Duclos, Araar Abdelkrim and Cari Fortin of Laval University (Canada). 
 
 
 
Appendix - B 
 
 
Methodology for Measuring Pro-Poor Growth: 
 
Absolute Perspective15: The measure of the rate of pro-poor growth proposed by Ravallion and Chen (2003) equals 
the ordinary rate of growth times a “distributional correction” given by the ratio of the actual change in poverty over 
time to the change that would have been observed under distribution neutrality. If the distributional shifts favor the 
poor, then the Rate of Pro-Poor Growth (RPPG) exceeds the ordinary rate of growth. If the shifts go against the poor 
then it is lower than the ordinary rate of growth. Thus, one can think of the second measure of the rate of pro-poor 
growth as the first measure times the ordinary rate of growth.  
 
For distributional correction component, they proposed to estimate ‘Growth Incidence Curve’ (GIC) which was first 
used by Ravallion and Chen (2001) in the pro-poor growth concept. The GIC gives rates of growth by percentiles of 
the distribution of income. Growth Incidence Curve may be derived as follows:  
 
݃௧ሺ݌ሻ ൌ  ൤
ܮ௧  ሺ݌ሻ
ܮ௧ିଵ ሺ݌ሻ
  ሺߛ௧ ൅ 1ሻ൨ െ 1  
 
 
where γt = (µt / µt-1)  is the growth rate in µt. It is evident from the equation that if the Lorenz curve (L) does not 
change, then gt(p) = γt for all p. Also gt(p) > γt if and only if γt(p)/µt is increasing over time. If gt(p) is a decreasing 
(increasing) function for all p then inequality falls (rises) over time for all inequality measures satisfying the Pigou-
Dalton transfer principle. If the GIC lies above zero everywhere (gt(p) > 0 for all p), then there is first-order 
dominance of the distribution at date t over t-1. If the GIC switches sign then one cannot in general infer whether 
higher-order dominance holds by looking at the GIC alone.  
 
At the 50th percentile, the Growth Incidence Curve indicates the growth rate of the median income. Ravallion and 
Chen (2003) have thus defined the “pro-poor growth rate” as the mean growth rate of the poor. There is clearly a 
difference between this mean growth rate of the poor and the ordinary growth rate of the mean income or 
consumption. 
 
 
Relative Perspective16: The poverty reduction depends on two factors. The first factor is the magnitude of 
economic growth rate; the larger the growth rate, the greater the poverty reduction. The second factor is the 
distribution of benefits of growth; if the benefits of growth go more to the poor than to the non-poor, then the 
poverty reduction will be larger. This implies that the policy of maximizing growth alone will not necessarily lead to 
a maximum reduction in poverty. The  idea of “poverty equivalent growth rate” (PEGR)  takes into account not only 
the magnitude of growth but also how much benefits the poor receive from growth. It is demonstrated that the 
proportional reduction in poverty is a monotonically increasing function of the PEGR; the larger the PEGR, the 
greater the proportional reduction in poverty. Thus, the maximization of PEGR will lead to a maximum reduction in 
poverty. 
 
Unit record household data for any two periods is required to estimate the PEGR. The poverty measure θ is fully 
characterized by the poverty line z, the mean income µ and the Lorenz curve L(p). That is 
 
ߠ ൌ  ߠሾݖ, ݑ, ܮሺ݌ሻሿ 
 
                                                            
15  For detailed methodology see Ravallion and Huppi (1991) and Ravallion and Chen (2001, 2003). 
 
16  For detailed methodology see Kakwani and Pernia (2000) and Kakwani et al. (2004). 
Suppose the income distributions in the initial and terminal years have mean income µ1 and µ2 with the Lorenz 
curves L1(p) and L2(p), respectively. An estimate of total poverty elasticity can be estimated by  
 
 
ߜ ൌ ሼሾ ln ሾߠሺݖ, ݑଶ, ܮଶሺ݌ሻ െ lnሾߠሺݖ, ݑଵ, ܮଵሺ݌ሻሿሽ / ߛ 
 
 
where γ is given by γ = Ln (µ2) – Ln (µ1), which is an estimate of growth rate of mean income. An estimate of PEGR 
is given by γ* = (δ / η) γ, where δ is an estimate of the growth elasticity of poverty, which should satisfy δ = η + ξ.  ξ 
is an estimate of the inequality effect of poverty reduction. Kakwani’s poverty decomposition methodology can then 
be used to calculate η and ξ by following formulae: 
 
 
    η ൌ ½ ሼ ln ሾߠ൫ݖ, ݑଶ, ܮଵሺ݌ሻ൯ሿ െ  ln ሾߠ൫ݖ, ݑଵ, ܮଵሺ݌ሻ൯ሿ ൅  ln ሾߠ൫ݖ, ݑଶ, ܮଶሺ݌ሻ൯ሿ െ ሺlnൣߠ൫ݖ, ݑଵ, ܮଶሺ݌ሻ൯൧ሽ 
 
and  
 
 
ξ ൌ ½ ሼ ln ሾߠ൫ݖ, ݑଵ, ܮଶሺ݌ሻ൯ሿ െ  ln ሾߠ൫ݖ, ݑଵ, ܮଵሺ݌ሻ൯ሿ ൅  ln ሾߠ൫ݖ, ݑଶ, ܮଶሺ݌ሻ൯ሿ െ ሺlnൣߠ൫ݖ, ݑଶ, ܮଵሺ݌ሻ൯൧ሽ 
 
 
which will always satisfy [δ = η + ξ]. This methodology can be used to estimate the PEGR for the entire class of 
poverty measures. The proportional reduction in poverty is equal to δ and γ, which is equal to (η γ*). Since η is 
always negative (unless µ1 = µ2), the magnitude of poverty reduction will be a monotonically increasing function of 
γ*; the larger γ*, the greater percentage reduction in poverty between the two periods. Thus, maximizing γ* will be 
equivalent to maximizing the percentage reduction in poverty. 
 
Growth will be assumed to be pro-poor if the PEGR is higher than the actual growth rate. If the PEGR is positive but 
smaller than the actual growth rate, it implies that growth is accompanied by an increase in inequality but a 
reduction in poverty is still observed. In such a case Kakwani et al. (2004) talk about a “trickle down” process where 
the poor receive proportionally less benefits from growth than the non-poor. Finally, if the PEGR is negative, one 
has the case where positive economic growth leads to an increase in poverty. 
Appendix - C 
Assessment of Pro-Poor Growth – Pakistan’s Empirics:  
 
Pasha and Palanivel (2005) have estimated the pro-poor growth for South Asia including Pakistan by using Growth 
Elasticity of Poverty (GEP). They concluded that GEP in case of Pakistan was negative (anti-poor) during 70’s and 
80’s and positive (pro-poor) during the 90’s. This simple approach however does not consider distributional 
characteristics of growth and thus is not an attractive method. Moreover, GEP also depends completely on the 
poverty measure17 considered for the pro-poorness investigation.  
 
Son (2004) computed poverty growth curves using international data for poverty and income distribution and 
concluded that growth in Pakistan was pro-poor during the 60’s (1964-1969) and in the early 90’s (1990-1996). For 
other periods the nature of growth was not pro-poor. The results for Pakistan are reproduced in the following Table. 
 
Trends in Nature of Growth – Relative Perspective of Pro-Poorness 
[Based on Group Data] 
Annual Growth Rate of Bottom Nature of Growth 
Years                   20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 
1964 –1969 11.4 9.12 7.63 6.25 4.54 Pro-poor 
1969–1979 0.42 0.64 0.77 0.87 1.07 Not Pro-Poor 
1979–1985 2.94 2.85 2.89 2.99 3.02 Not Pro-Poor 
1985– 1990 0.88 1.47 1.74 1.88 1.99 Not Pro-Poor 
1990– 1996 3.92 3 2.18 1.5 1.39 Pro-poor 
Source: Son (2004) 
 
While Son (2004) approach was based on relative criterion of pro-poor growth, Omar and Jafri (2008) assessed 
Pakistan’s growth performance using absolute perception and estimated RPPG proposed by Ravallion and Chen 
(2003).  They found that, “overall….growth in Pakistan was pro-poor in (the) seventies18, eighties and 2000s, with 
varying degrees, and anti-poor in the nineties”. They also examined growth in incomes of those beneath the poverty 
line (four bottom deciles). The findings of their research indicate that the bottom decile (1st decile) experienced the 
sharpest growth (decline) in income relative to subsequent deciles in pro-poor (anti-poor) episodes. This suggests 
that much of the growth (decline) in the income of the poor took place among the ‘poorest of the poor’. The main 
results from Omar and Jafri (2008) are reproduced below.  
 
 
Trends in Nature of Growth – Absolute Perspective of Pro-Poorness 
[Based on Group Data] 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Nature of Growth  Pro-Poor Pro-Poor Anti-Poor Pro-Poor 
Rate of Pro-Poor Growth 6.33 8.98 –7.13 10.45 
Growth in Survey Mean 6.4 1.61 1.14 1.38 
GDP Growth 5.05 6.59 5.52 4.72 
Growth in Initial Deciles 
1st Decile 7.54 10.62 –8.30 16.3 
2nd Decile 5.66 8.84 –5.57 8.98 
3rd Decile 5.96 7.4 –4.39 6.92 
4th Decile 6.18 6.31 –3.57 6.14 
Source: Omar and Jafri (2008) 
 
                                                            
17  For this exercise, Pasha and Palanivel used poverty incidence (headcount).  
 
18 The surveys to cover decade  as follows: seventies (1979, 1987-88); eighties (1987-88, 1998-99); 2000s (1998-99, 
2004-05) 
 
The above statistical findings covering both perspectives of pro-poorness are based on group data (deciles or 
quartiles). To avoid aggregation biases, Jamal (2009) quantifies the Pro-Poor using unit record data of household 
surveys for two different political regimes and growth episodes. He concluded that high economic growth that 
occurred during the early 2000’s led to poverty reduction but was not accompanied by lowering inequality. The 
evaluation of growth during 2000 suggests that the rich benefited much more than the poor. This eventually resulted 
in a lower reduction of the poverty incidence. On the contrary, the poor have been more adversely affected during a 
low growth scenario during the 90’s.  
 
Anwar (2010) analyzed the role of growth and inequality in explaining changes in poverty using three household 
surveys; 1998-99, 2001-02 and 2004-05. He assessed the growth in urban and rural area by using absolute 
perceptive of pro-Poorness. The author narrates that “the Growth Incidence Curve highlighted the role of inequality 
in the first period and that of growth in the second period in explaining the changes in absolute poverty.   Over the 
period as a whole he concludes that “from 1998-99 to 2004-05, while the effects of growth remained dominant, the 
redistribution component seems to have benefited only the urban areas. On the other hand, redistribution seems to 
have adversely affected the poor in rural areas. 
